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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, U.C.A. § 78-2-
2(3)0) a nd Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This case was poured over 
to the Utah Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Ms. Pasquin's alleged oral 
partnership agreement was void under the statute of frauds and that consequently Ms. 
Pasquin's claims against the Duffins should be dismissed with prejudice. 
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact, the appellate court views the facts and all reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. It reviews the trial 
court's conclusions of law for correctness, including its conclusion that there are no material 
fact issues. Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dev. Corp.. v. Campbell. 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 
1992). 
2. Whether the Duffins owed any duty to Ms. Pasquin. 
The reviewing court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground 
available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below. Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 
855 P.2d231 (Utah) 1993). 
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3. Whether the trial court correctly denied Ms. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motion 
with respect to the Duffins. 
The appellate court reviews a trial court's denial of a Rule 56(f) motion under 
an abuse of discretion standard. Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
U.C.A. § 25-5-4 Certain agreements void unless written and 
signed. 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, 
or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, 
signed by the party to be charged with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement which by its terms is 
not to be performed within one year from the 
making of the agreement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. John and Kory Pasquin formed Quality Parts, a Utah general 
partnership, early in the 1990s. John and Kory Pasquin formed Quality Transport 
Refrigeration Parts, Inc., a Utah corporation ("Quality Transport") in early 1996 to take over 
the business of Quality Parts. (R. 94) 
2. Thomas and Daniel Duffin ("the Duffins") are attorneys practicing law 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. Beginning in 1990 the Duffins handled business matters on behalf 
of Quality Parts and subsequently Quality Transport. The Duffins' clients were Kory and 
John Pasquin. (R. 84, 86) 
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3. Ms. Pasquin alleges in her complaint that after Kory and John Pasquin 
formed Quality Parts, Kory Pasquin recruited her to become a partner. (R. 94, 95) The 
partnership was pursuant to an oral partnership agreement, although Ms. Pasquin argues that 
Quality Parts' invoices, paychecks and car insurance payments evidenced the agreement to 
make Ms. Pasquin a partner.1 (R. 88, 94-95) 
4. Ms. Pasquin5s complaint also alleges that she entered into an oral 
agreement with Kory Pasquin for lifetime employment. (R. 96) 
5. Ms. Pasquin claims that when Kory and John Pasquin formed Quality 
Transport, they led her "to believe that her one-third partnership interest in Quality Parts 
would transfer over to a one-third interest in [Quality Transport] and that Quality Transport 
"would honor all agreements that Quality Parts had with [Ms. Pasquin]." (R. 96) 
6. Between 1991 and 1994 Thomas Duffin had no contact with Ms. 
Pasquin in a business sense as a partner of Quality Parts or as a person having any interest 
in Quality Transport. He had no specific dealings with Ms. Pasquin at all.2 (R. 84) 
7. During the time Quality Transport was incorporating, Daniel Duffin had 
conversations with Kory and John Pasquin. Ms. Pasquin's name was never mentioned during 
this time nor in any subsequent conversations with either Kory or John Pasquin. (R. 86) 
*Ms. Pasquin opposed the Duffins' Motion for Summary Judgment by verifying 
the allegations in her complaint (R. 88, 93-106) and submitting three additional 
paragraphs of alleged material facts in a "Statement of Disputed Facts." (R.88) 
2The affidavits of Thomas and Daniel Duffin submitted in support of their Motion 
for Summary Judgment (R. 83-86) are attached in the Addendum to this brief. 
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8. From 1993 to the date of Kory Pasquin's death, Daniel Duffin had no 
contact with Ms. Pasquin in a business sense as a partner in Quality Parts or as a person 
having any interest in the Quality Transport. He had no specific dealings with Ms. Pasquin 
at all. (R. 86) 
9. Neither of the Duffins is aware of any writing representing Ms. Pasquin 
had an ownership interest in either Quality Parts or Quality Transport. (R. 84, 86) 
10. The first and only contact Ms. Pasquin alleges with the Duffins occurred 
after Kory Pasquin's death.3 A meeting took place in the Duffins' law offices wherein it was 
alleged by a Boyd Simper in the presence of the Duffins that Ms. Pasquin was "part of the 
company." Ms. Pasquin alleges no other direct contact with the Duffins on the subject of her 
partnership, ownership interest in Quality Transport or lifetime employment agreement. (R. 
97) 
11. Ms. Pasquin alleges in her complaint that the Duffins were her lawyers 
because she was a partner in Quality Parts. She alleges that by assisting John and Kory 
Pasquin in forming the Quality Transport corporation and transferring assets and business 
of the partnership thereto without providing for her ownership interest, the Duffins breached 
fiduciary duties owed to her. (R. 100-101) 
3Kory Pasquin passed away after formation of Quality Transport. Accordingly, 
Ms. Pasquin alleges no communication whatsoever with the Duffins when the alleged 
oral partnership between John, Kory and Ms. Pasquin existed. 
4 
12. Ms. Pasquin states in her complaint "if [the Duffins] were not fully 
aware of plaintiff s claim of a partnership interest in said assets and business prior to Kory's 
death, the statements of Boyd Simper that plaintiff was a part of the partnership put them on 
notice of their fiduciary duty to plaintiff. Yet the Duffins have advised John and the 
company to resist the plaintiffs claims and have expressly induced the company and John 
to breach their employment agreements with the plaintiff." (R. 101) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly held that the oral partnership agreement alleged by Ms. 
Pasquin was void under the statute of frauds. A majority of courts considering similar facts 
have held that an oral partnership agreement not to be performed within a year is terminable 
at will. Accordingly, the oral partnership agreement alleged by Ms. Pasquin was terminated 
when Kory and John Pasquin formed the Quality Transport corporation. 
Ms. Pasquin's alleged partial performance of the oral partnership agreement 
and her equitable estoppel claim do not defeat the Duffins5 statute of frauds defense. Partial 
performance does not vitiate the statute of frauds and Ms. Pasquin failed to offer any material 
facts to support an equitable estoppel claim against the Duffins. 
The Duffins owed no legal duty to Ms. Pasquin because no attorney-client or 
other fiduciary relationship existed between the Duffins and Ms. Pasquin. Finally, the trial 
correctly denied Ms. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motion with respect to the Duffins because Ms. 
Pasquin failed to supply the trial court with any verified material facts indicating what 
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additional facts she sought to discover that might assist in proving her claims against the 
Duffins. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE ALLEGED 
ORAL PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT WAS VOID UNDER THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
A. Any Oral Partnership Agreement that May have Existed with Ms. 
Pasquin was Terminable at Will 
The Estate of Kory Pasquin moved first for summary judgment in this case, 
arguing that the oral partnership agreement and lifetime employment agreement alleged by 
Ms. Pasquin were void under UCA 25-5-4(1) because they were not to be performed within 
a year. (R. 76-78) The Duffins joined the Estate's motion and filed as additional support the 
affidavits of Thomas and Daniel Duffin. (R. 80-86) Ms. Pasquin filed an opposing 
memorandum, which she supported by verifying her Complaint and submitting three 
additional paragraphs of verified facts contained in a "Statement of Disputed Facts."4 (R. 87-
106) 
4On September 25 and October 10, 1998 Ms. Pasquin filed additional memoranda 
opposing summary judgment and in support of her Rule 56(f) motion (R. 143-148, 155-
162) Ms. Pasquin's opposing memoranda contained verifications under which she 
purports to have "read the foregoing instrument and that based upon my personal 
knowledge the factual allegations contained therein are true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge and information." Ms. Pasquin's verification of legal memoranda containing 
mixed factual allegations and legal arguments should be disregarded by this court. To the 
extent verified, material facts may be gleaned from Ms. Pasquin's memoranda, they have 
no bearing on the Duffins' Motion for Summary Judgment or issues relevant to the 
Duffins' appellate arguments. 
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Ms. Pasquin argued in her opposing memorandum that the oral agreement to 
make her a partner could be performed within a year. She claimed that since the agreement 
to make her a partner was performed immediately and she thereafter performed as partner, 
the statute of frauds is inapplicable. (R. 89) Ms. Pasquin also argued that writings supported 
the oral partnership agreement and the employment agreement.5 (R.89-90) 
The trial court granted the Estate of Pasquin and Duffins' Motions for 
Summary Judgment for the reasons specified in the supporting memoranda. (R. 153) The 
court subsequently entered its Amended Summary Judgment with respect to the Duffin 
defendants, stating there was no cause of action against the Duffins by plaintiff as there is 
no evidence of a partnership between the plaintiff and the other defendants." (R. 215) 
Most courts considering this issue have agreed with the trial court's ruling in 
this case, holding that a parol agreement for a partnership intended to last more than a year 
is void under the statute of frauds. 
In Wahl v. Barnum. 22 N.E. 280 (N.Y. 1889) plaintiffs verbally agreed with 
one of the defendants to form a co-partnership for three years to succeed defendants' former 
firm. The defendant was to contribute the remaining merchandise of the old firm and the 
plaintiffs were each to contribute $5,000.00 toward partnership capital. No time for payment 
5Although Ms. Pasquin claimed that several different writings supported her 
partnership status, the only writing she submitted to the trial court consisted of a Quality 
Parts invoice bearing in the bottom right hand comer the legend: "Please accept our 
sincere thanks for letting us serve you Kory - John & Geri." (R. 107) 
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of the partnership capital was agreed upon. The Wahl court held that the contract of co-
partnership was within the clause of the statute of frauds requiring contracts not to be 
performed within a year to be in writing and was hence "determinable at will". Id. at 282. 
In Pinner v. Leder. 188 N.Y.S. 818 (1921) the court held an oral partnership 
agreement to continue for more than three years falls within the statute of frauds. The court 
held that the oral agreement was not void in and of itself, but only under the statute of frauds. 
The court further observed that: 
An oral agreement described in the statute of frauds in not void 
in and of itself, but only void under the statute, and the plea of 
its invalidity must be affirmatively interposed . . . The mere fact 
that the contract is terminable at the will of one party renders it 
nonetheless a contract recognized as valid and subsisting until 
such determination. If a partnership is one dissolvable at will, 
a partner's election to dissolve the partnership is not a breach of 
the partnership contract and there is no right to recover damages 
resulting from the dissolution, in the absence of a partnership 
agreement to the contrary." 
Id. at 819. 
59A Am Jur. 2d Partnership § 88 (1974), echoes the above holdings, stating 
"an oral partnership agreement without provision for its duration creates a partnership at will 
and while it is dissoluble within one year for purposes of the statute of frauds, it need not 
necessarily terminate in that time." 
At least one court has held contra. In Shropshire v. Adams, 89 S.W. 448 (Tex. 
1905) the court held that an oral partnership contract to be continued for five years was not 
within the statute of frauds. The court reasoned that "inasmuch as the death of either party 
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would work a dissolution of the partnership . . . it follows, also, that the contract of 
partnership was not within the statute of frauds." Id. at 449. 
The Shropshire court's reasoning is suspect, in that it would effectively 
eviscerate the one year provision contained in UCA 25-5-4(1) and similar statutes. Applying 
the Shropshire court's reasoning, parties could argue that any number of contingencies might 
occur which would terminate the partnership within one year. Death of a partner, dissolution 
by one of the partners or some other imagined event that rendered performance impossible 
could conceivably occur within the one year period. Under the Shropshire court's analytical 
approach, it would be difficult to ever demonstrate that a partnership agreement (or indeed 
most contracts) could not be performed within a year. 
Ms. Pasquin has never alleged that the alleged oral partnership agreement 
between herself and John and Kory Pasquin was to be performed within a year. Indeed she 
alleges that she was to be employed by the partnership for her life, implying that the 
partnership was to last at least until her death. Accordingly, the alleged partnership was, at 
most, a partnership at will. 
If a partnership is one at will, without any definite term or definite undertaking 
to be accomplished, a dissolution by the election of one partner is not a breach of contract. 
The terminating partner incurs no liability, whatever the motive for the termination may have 
been. This rule extends to bar tort and other claims premised upon an unenforceable 
contract. Mildfelt v. Lair. 561 P.2d 805, 813 (Kan. 1977). 
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Even if the alleged oral partnership agreement existed, any partnership formed 
thereby was dissolved at the formation of Quality Transport. Because the oral agreement 
created — at most - a partnership at will, no action exists by Ms. Pasquin against the Duffins 
for breach of contract, tort or any other claim premised upon the unenforceable contract. 
B. Ms, Pasquin's Alleged Partial Performance Does not Overcome the 
Duffins' Statute of Frauds Defense 
Ms. Pasquin also argues since she immediately commenced performance under 
the terms of the alleged oral partnership agreement, the agreement is not encompassed by the 
statute of frauds. However, it is clear that partial performance of a contract within a year 
does not take it out of the operation of the statute of frauds. The term "performance" in the 
one year statute of frauds provision means complete performance. Pemberton v. LaDue 
Realty & Constr. Co., 244 S.W. 2d 62 (Mo. 1951); Sophie v. Ford. 245 N.Y.S. 470 (1930). 
The statute of frauds renders a contract not fully to be performed within a year — insofar as 
executory — completely unenforceable, and does not permit it to be enforced against the 
defendant to the extent that its performance within a year is called for. Pemberton at 64. 
C. Ms, Pasquin's Equitable Estoppel Claim has no Bearing on the 
Duffins' Statute of Frauds Defense 
Ms. Pasquin relies on Jacobsen v. Cox. 202 P.2d 714 (Utah 1949) to argue that 
the Duffins' statute of frauds defense is rendered inoperative by an estoppel in pais. An 
estoppel in pais is the doctrine by which a person may be precluded by his act or conduct, or 
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silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have 
had. Mitchell v. Mclntee. 514 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Or. 1973). 
To constitute an equitable estoppel, or estoppel by conduct, (1) there must be 
a false representation; (2) it must be made with knowledge of the facts; (3) the other party 
must have been ignorant of the truth; (4) it must have been made with the intention that it 
should be acted upon by the other party; and (5) the other party must have been induced to 
act upon it. Mitchell at 1359. 
As argued above, Ms. Pasquin has alleged no false representation by either of 
the Duffms. In addition, the only record evidence before the court shows the Duffms had no 
knowledge that Ms. Pasquin even claimed a partnership interest. Ms. Pasquin did not submit 
any verified, material facts to support her naked allegation that the Duffms knew or should 
have known of the alleged oral partnership agreement. In short, Ms. Pasquin has submitted 
no material fact that would preclude the Duffms, by reason of equitable estoppel, from 
asserting their statute of frauds defense. 
II. THE DUFFINS OWED NO LEGAL DUTY TO MS. PASQUIN 
A. No Attorney-Client Relationship Existed Between the Duffms and 
Ms, Pasquin 
The Duffms submitted affidavits in support of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment alleging they never considered Ms. Pasquin a client, were not aware that she was 
ever a partner in Quality Parts and were not aware of any right on Ms. Pasquin's part to 
lifetime employment. Based on these affidavits, the Duffms argued that Ms. Pasquin could 
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not prevail on her claim against them, including her claims for breach of fiduciary duty, 
interference with contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
The trial court did not reach the issue of whether the Duffins' owed Ms. 
Pasquin any duty, ruling that the alleged oral partnership agreement was void under the 
statute of frauds. However, the lack of an attorney-client or other fiduciary relationship 
provides this court with an additional basis for upholding the trial court's summary judgment 
with regard to the Duffins. A reviewing court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on 
any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below. Higgins v. Salt 
Lake County. 855 P.2d231 (Utah 1993). 
Ms. Pasquin argues in her brief that her "sworn testimony states that she was 
made a partner, that she did consider [the Duffins] to be her attorneys, that she was promised 
lifetime employment, and such [sic]. Ms. Pasquin's sworn testimony disputed all materials 
facts argued by the Duffin defendants in their motion." (Ms. Pasquin's opening brief, p. 30.) 
A client's mere belief that an attorney-client relationship exists, unless 
reasonably induced by representations or conduct of the attorney, is not sufficient to create 
the relationship. Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716, 727 (Utah App. 1990). In 
Breuer-Harrison, a real estate purchaser brought action against a vendor for rescission and 
the vendor cross-claimed against a title insurer for negligence. The Court of Appeals held 
that neither the title insurer nor searching attorney could be held liable to the vendor for 
negligence in failing to discover an irremediable easement. 
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In holding that no attorney-client relationship - and hence no duty - existed, 
the Utah Court of Appeals observed that "an attorney-client relationship cannot be created 
unilaterally in the mind of a would-be client; a reasonable belief is required." Id. at 728, 
citing Hecht v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 3rd 560, 237 Cal. Rptr. 528, 531 (1987). The 
rationale for this rule is readily apparent: it would be manifestly unfair to impose an attorney-
client relationship on an attorney when he or she has no reasonable basis to know such a 
relationship exists. 
Because no attorney-client relationship existed between Ms. Pasquin and the 
Duffins, there is no liability on the part of the Duffins to Ms. Pasquin. No liability exists 
under the law of torts unless a person from whom relief is sought owed a duty to the 
allegedly injured party. Vickers v. Hanover Const. Co., Inc., 875 P.2d 929 (Id. 1994). In this 
case there is no factual or legal basis for a duty owed by the Duffins to Ms. Pasquin. 
It is well-settled that an attorney, while performing his obligations to his client, 
is not liable to third parties in the absence of fraudulent or malicious conduct. McQue v. 
Hyatt Legal Services. Inc., 813 P.2d 754, 756-57 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Marelius v. Field. 
DeGoff. Huppert & McGowan. 160 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1979); Atkinson v. IHC Hospital Inc.. 
798 P.2d 733, 735-36 (Utah 1990) (an attorney had no duty to properly advise plaintiffs on 
the adequacy of settlement of a claim where the attorney was retained by the hospital against 
which the claim was made for purposes of drafting settlement documents for presentation to 
the court for approval). 
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The only basis for Ms. Pasquin to allege that the Duffins were her attorneys is 
that the Duffins represented the partnership and that she was a member of the partnership 
under the alleged oral agreement. Ms. Pasquin alleged no specific communications or 
actions on the part of the Duffins to support her belief that the Duffins were her attorneys. 
She alleged nothing to indicate that the Duffins were ever informed or knew that she claimed 
to be a partner, until well after the corporation had been formed and the partnership at will 
had been dissolved. She pled no facts indicating fraudulent or malicious conduct on the part 
of the Duffins. Accordingly, Ms. Pasquin may not hold the Duffins liable in connection with 
the Duffins' representation of Kory and John Pasquin. 
B. The Duffins Owed Ms. Pasquin No Separate Fiduciary Duty 
Fiduciary duties do not exist in the abstract nor arise out of thin air. They are 
1) created by or arise out of contract or 2) implied in law under circumstances such as when 
there is confidence reposed on one side and resulting domination and influence on the other. 
First Security Bank v. Banberry Development. 786 P.2d 1326, 1332-33 (Utah 1990); 
Dennison State Bank v. Madeira. 640 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Kan. 1982). 
No contract ever existed between the Duffins and Ms. Pasquin out of which 
a fiduciary duty could arise. As argued above, the Duffins did not represent Ms. Pasquin in 
any capacity. The Duffins were not parties to the alleged oral contracts for partnership or 
lifetime employment and cannot be held liable for any obligations or breach of duties arising 
thereunder. An agent acting within the scope of his authority is not liable in tort to third 
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persons for economic harm caused by his actions. State Ex. Rel. Ranni Assoc, v. 
Hartenbach. 742 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. Banc. 1987); American Ins. Co. v. Material Transmit 
Inc.. 446 A.2d 1101 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1982); Greyhound Corporation v. Commercial Cas. Ins. 
Ca, 19 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
Section 359 of Restatement of Agency (Second) (1958) clearly states this rule 
as follows: 
An agent who intentionally or negligently fails to perform duties 
to his principal is not thereby liable to a third person whose 
economic interests are thereby harmed. 
This case is analogous to one where an insurance company hires an attorney 
to represent the insurance company in the matter of settlement of claims against its insured. 
When an attorney is representing only the interest of the insurance company in the matter of 
the settlement of claims against the insured, "if the attorney fails to give proper consideration 
to the interests of the insured causing loss to the insured there is no cause of action against 
the attorney because he owes no duty in that respect to the insured. In that case, the insured's 
cause of action is only against the insurance company." Lysick v. Walcom. 258 Cal. App. 
2d 136, 65 Cal. Reptr. 406, 415-16 (1968). 
Similarly, no circumstances exist in this case such that a fiduciary duty should 
be implied in law. It is undisputed that Ms. Pasquin had no basis to repose confidence in the 
Duffins. The Duffins' unrebutted affidavits state that they never had any knowledge that Ms. 
Pasquin was or claimed to be a partner in Quality Parts. Because there was no 
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communication whatsoever between the Duffins and Ms. Pasquin there was no way for them 
to exercise domination and influence over Ms. Pasquin. 
No fiduciary duty existed under contract or could be implied in law under the 
facts existing in this case. Accordingly, the Duffins cannot be held liable by Ms. Pasquin for 
legal advice rendered to their clients: the Quality Parts partnership consisting of Kory and 
John Pasquin or the Quality Transport corporation formed by Kory and John Pasquin. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED MS. PASQUIN'S RULE 
56(f) MOTION WITH RESPECT TO THE DUFFINS 
Ms. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motion was correctly denied with respect to the 
Duffins because Ms. Pasquin failed to support her motion with an affidavit specifying the 
facts she believed further discovery would produce to defeat the Duffins' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. In Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion for 
similar reasons, explaining: 
[E]ven if a party does file an affidavit or the court is willing to 
consider other material in place of an affidavit, the opposing 
party must nevertheless explain how the continuance will aid his 
opposition to summary judgment, [citations omitted] . . . the 
party opposing the motion must present facts in proper form... 
And the opposing party's facts must be material and of a 
substantial nature. 
id at 841 citing 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice f^ 56.15[3] 
(2ded. 1987). 
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In this case, Ms. Pasquin merely argued in her Rule 56(f) motion that she had 
made timely discovery requests and attempted depositions, but was thwarted in her discovery 
efforts by the Pasquin defendants' failure to cooperate or other events beyond her control. 
She nowhere states in her Rule 56(f) supporting memorandum what specific facts she sought 
to discover that might assist in proving her claims against the Duffms. Indeed any such 
allegation on her part would contradict the allegation in her Verified Complaint that her first 
contact with the Duffms on the subject of her alleged status as a partner or lifetime employee 
occurred at a meeting in the fall of 1996 in the Duffms' offices. (R. 97) 
Ms. Pasquin did not and could not have submitted specific facts in an affidavit 
supporting a Rule 56(f) motion opposing the Duffin defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Accordingly, the court correctly denied the Rule 56(f) motion with regard to the 
Duffin defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly held that the alleged oral partnership agreement was 
void under the statute of frauds. The Duffms owed no legal duty to Ms. Pasquin. Ms. 
Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motion with respect to the Duffms' Motion for Summary Judgment 
dismissing with prejudice Ms. Pasquin's claims against the Duffms was properly denied. 
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Accordingly, this court should affirm the trial court's Amended Summary Judgment 
dismissing with prejudice Ms. Pasquin's claims against the Duffins. 
DATED this "2-Sday of November, 1998. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
Thomas A. Duffin and Daniel O. Duffin 
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A D D E N D U M 
CARMAN E.KIPP 1829 
MICHAEL F. SK0LNICK4671 
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT 5352 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P. C. 
Attorneys for Thomas A. Duffin & Daniel 0. Duffin 
10 Exchange Place - Newhouse Building 
Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
(801)521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GERI PASQUIN, : AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS A. DUFFIN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
JOHN PASQUIN; JIMMIE PASQUIN; 
THE ESTATE OF KORY PASQUIN; 
QUALITY PARTS, a Utah general 
partnership; QUALITY TRANSPORT 
REFRIGERATION PARTS, INC.; 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN AND DANIEL O. 
DUFFIN, : Civil No. 970900011 CV 
Defendants. Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
" SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Thomas A. Duffin, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
1. That I am a lawyer licensed to practice law in the state of Utah. 
1 
2. That I was the lawyer handling business matters on behalf of Quality 
Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc.; and Quality Parts, a Utah general partnership. My 
clients during this period of time were Kory Pasquin and John Pasquin. 
3. That in approximately 1990, John Pasquin contacted me concerning 
the representation of Quality Parts, a business, which at that time was located on 
Redwood Road. I met with him and Kory Pasquin during that period of time. 
4. That between 1991 and 1994, telephone calls were always exchanged 
between Quality Parts and this law firm. During this period of time, I had no contact with 
Geri Pasquin in a business sense as a partner of Quality Parts or as a person having any 
interest in the corporation, Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc. I had no specific 
dealings with Geri Pasquin at all. 
5. That there are no writings of which I am aware that would represent 
to this court that Geri Pasquin had any interest in either of these businesses. She may 
have been an employee, but she certainly had no ownership interest. 
DATED this f day of AJLJL-& 1997. 
Thomas A. Duffin pJ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this W l day of September, 
1997. Notary Public 
JENEFER WELCH 
757 West 1300 South 
Woods Cross, Utaft 84087 
My Commission Expires 
February 24 2001 
— SjajeoiUte!?_ j j 
CARMAN E. KIPP 1829 
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK4671 
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT 5352 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P. C. 
Attorneys for Thomas A. Duffin & Daniel 0. Duffin 
10 Exchange Place - Newhouse Building 
Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
(801)521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GERI PASQUIN, AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL 0. DUFFIN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN PASQUIN; JIMMIE PASQUIN; 
THE ESTATE OF KORY PASQUIN; 
QUALITY PARTS, a Utah general 
partnership; QUALITY TRANSPORT 
REFRIGERATION PARTS, INC.; 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN AND DANIEL O. 
DUFFIN, Civil No. 970900011 CV 
Defendants. Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Daniel 0. Duffin, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
1. That I am a lawyer licensed to practice law in the state of Utah. 
1 
2. That I was the lawyer handling business matters on behalf of Quality 
Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc.; and Quality Parts, a Utah general partnership. My 
clients during this period of time were Kory Pasquin and John Pasquin. 
3. That during the time of incorporation of Transport Refrigeration Parts, 
Inc, I had conversations with both Kory Pasquin and John Pasquin. Geri Pasquin's name 
was never mentioned during this time nor in any subsequent conversations with either of 
myCl
'
entS
' £& 
4. That botwoon 1001 w H 0 0 1 ; telephone calls were always exchanged 
between Quality Parts and this law firm. During this period of time, I had no contact with 
Geri Pasquin in a business sense as a partner of Quality Parts or as a person having any 
interest in the corporation, Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc. I had no specific 
dealings with Geri Pasquin at all. 
5. That there are no writings of which I am aware that would represent 
to this court that Geri Pasquin had any interest in either of these businesses. She may 
have been an employee, but she certainly had no ownership interest. 
DATED this ? day of ^gereufcgfc. 1997. 
(^ d£ 
Daniel 0. Duffirr 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ffifrl da^of September, 
1 9 9 7 . JT ^MTB^V Notary PUSHC 
JENEFERWET 
757 West 1300 South 
Woods Cross Utah 84067 
My Commission Expires 
February 24,2001 
. — StatejofUtah^^ J j 
